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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the optimal choice of allowance allocation method for the emissions trading system to be 
established under China’s carbon intensity target. Compared with emission-based allocation, output-based allocation 
could help to realize the industry’s optimal welfare in a closed trading system and thus is more appropriate for the 
emissions trading system to be established in China. However, the output-based allocation does face some challenges 
in the implementation process. An ex-post adjustment approach is proposed to ensure that the allocation rate equals to 
the carbon intensity target and a conversion factor approach proposed to convert different types of products into the 
same measure. 
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1. Introduction 
Emissions trading is a cost-effective market-based instrument designed to control greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by introducing a new market and providing economic incentives to participants of this 
market. It  internalizes the environmental costs and helps to achieve more efficient allocation of resources. 
In such systems, allowances allocated or sold represent the right to emit or discharge a specific volume of 
GHG. A llocation methods will d irectly affect the cost of meeting a set emission reduction goal (Baron et 
al, 2002). Therefore, allowances allocation is one of the most important issues in the design of an 
emissions trading scheme.  
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Allowances can be allocated for free or sold by auction. Free allocation of allowances can be based on 
historical emissions, output or input. Relative literature mainly focuses on the assessment and analysis of 
emissions-based and output-based allocation approaches. In closed trading systems (no trading with 
outside systems) with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances 
proportionally to past emissions are first-best according to the analysis based on a simple mult i-period 
partial equilibrium model (Böhringer et  al, 2005). As for economic efficiency, the emissions-based 
allocation ru le is more costly than the output-based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in  
energy-intensive industries  (Böhringer, 2005). In the European cement industry under the EU ETS, 
grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers causes significant production losses  while an 
output-based allocation over 75% of h istoric unitary emissions has insignificant impact  on production 
levels (Demailly, 2006). Allocation by auctioning, with the virtue of high efficiency, good liquidity and 
strong incentive on innovation, is considered as the most appropriate method (Cramton et al, 2002; Benz 
et al, 2007; Sterner et al, 2008). However, auctioning will cause the heaviest burden and highest s tranded 
costs on sectors or firms and make the emissions trading system difficult to accept (Baron, 2002).  
China, as one of the developing countries  with rap id economic growth, unveiled in November 2009 its 
GHG emissions control target, i.e. to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit GDP (carbon 
intensity) by 40-45% by 2020, compared with 2005. This carbon intensity goal will be included as one of 
the binding targets in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. China is now considering possible means to help the 
achievement of this target, including “pilot the emissions trading in specific sectors or regions ” (State 
Council, 2009) and “the establishment and improvement of an emissions trading scheme” (State Council, 
2010).  
Most researches on allowance allocation are based on the assumption of an absolute emissions cap 
which is not consistent with China’s future emissions trading system. China’s carbon intensity target is a 
kind of relative target, d ifferent from the absolute ones established by many developed countries, to which 
most of the existing experience is related. From the definition of GDP carbon intensity: 
    GDPY
EmissionsEIntensityI   
it is obvious that uncertainty in GDP translates into uncertainty in the quantity of emissions under carbon 
intensity target while it  translates into uncertainty in emissions intensity under an absolute cap  (Ellerman, 
2003). 
GDP is a macro  indicator which cannot be applied to a single organization while has very close linkage 
with the industrial added value. For simplification, let’s assume that the industrial output value is a linear 
function of output. Accordingly, we could define the carbon intensity of an industry or an organization by 
its output: 
    OutputQ
EmissionsEIntensityI   
The carbon intensity target changes the constraint condition on emissions of an industry:  
¦ ¦ ii qIe  
where ei denotes the emissions of participant i and qi denotes the corresponding output. Intensity ( I ) is a  
constant as regulated and the total amount of emissions could increase proportionally to the output. 
Different constraint condition changes the first-order conditions of achieving industry’s optimal welfare. 
Accordingly, the allocation method to be used in China’s future emissions trading scheme will also be 
different from those used in the absolute cap systems.  
This paper only considers a closed emissions trading system. A simple partial equilibrium model is 
used to analyze the most appropriate allocation method under China’s carbon intensity target. The 
challenges associated with this allocation method and possible solutions are also discussed. 
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2. Comparison of allocation methods 
In this part, a comparison is made between the output-based allocation approach and the emission-
based allocation approach under carbon intensity target. Then an analysis is made on the conditions to 
achieve the industry’s optimal welfare. Lastly, the most appropriate allocation method for China’s future 
emissions trading scheme is discussed. 
Assume that: 
1) The corresponding market is a perfect competitive one; 
2) Each participant in this market is a price taker; 
3) The participants are in the same industry and produce only one type of product.  
The carbon intensity target of the industry is defined as the amount of GHG emitted per unit of output, 
thus the unit of the carbon intensity target ( I ) is defined as tCO2/unit of output. Also assume that the 
allowance market is also a perfect competitive one, where allowances can be traded freely among all 
participants and the allowance price is decided by the market. 
Define participant i’s (i=1,2,…,n) cost function of production as  Ci (qi, ei), where qi denotes the output 
level and ei the emissions emerg ing from the production level of qi. The part icipant’s product is sold at 
the price pi as decided by the market. As usual, costs Ci is assumed to be twice differentiable and convex 
with iqC =∂Ci/∂q > 0ˈ ieC =∂Ci/∂eİ0, meaning that the cost is positively correlated with production and 
negatively correlated with emissions . For compliance, the part icipant must hold allowances for emissions 
e
i
 and the market price of allowance is pa. 
For comparison, we assume that part of allowances are allocated based on emissions and the remaining 
part based on output. θ denotes the allocation rate (tCO2/unit of output) based on output and λ denotes the 
allocation based on emissions. θ and λ are non-negative. 
Under the conditions assumed, the industry’s optimal welfare is obtained by:  > @iiiii
ie
eqCqp
i
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This yields the following first-order conditions: 
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 (2) 
To realize the industry’s optimal welfare, the marg inal production costs should equal to the consumer 
price p lus the product of allowance price and the intensity, and the marg inal abatement costs  for all 
participants should be the same. *ap  is endogenously determined by the intensity constraint 
i
i
i
i
qIe 6 6 . 
Every  participant is pursuing to maximize its profits and this does not necessarily  result in the 
industry’s optimal welfare. However, the policy  maker should help to achieve the industry’s optimal 
welfare. The most appropriate policy should ensure that each participant’s maximum profit and the 
industry’s optimal welfare could be achieved at the same time.  
Assume that the allowance price is pa, participant i’s profit Wi after participation in the emissions 
trading system is as following:    iiiaiiiiii qeepeqCqpW  TO,  (3) 
To maximize the participant’s profit, i
eq
W
ii
,
max , the first-order conditions are as following:  
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Equations (4) and (5) show that the industry’s optimal welfare  which is characterized  by equations (1) 
and (2), can be achieved with the following conditions: I T and 0 O . It means that if allowance is 
allocated in accordance with output instead of emissions, under the carbon intensity target, the optimal 
welfare could be achieved. Besides, equation (4) shows that the allowance’s price will always exceed the 
marginal abatement cost if allowance is allocated based on emissions. 
Under the carbon intensity target, the emissions trading scheme imposes a marginal cost to emissions 
while the output-based allocation offers a subsidy ( Tap ) to output. This characteristic makes output-
based allocation more acceptable for the possible participants and the emissions trading system easier to 
be implemented. 
As mentioned, the allocation method analyzed is based on a single compliance period. If the allocation 
is based on historical emissions or production, the item apO  in the equation (4) and the item Tap  in 
the equation (5) will be rep laced by the function of future allowance price and allocation rate on output 
and emissions. But the change of the first-order conditions will not influence the outcome, i.e. I T , 
0 O . Therefore the most appropriate allocation method under the intensity target remains the same. 
Input-based allocation, in  most literature, means to allocate allowances proportionally to  energy input. 
Assume that f is the energy input and η is the allocation rate based on energy input. The quantity of 
energy input is generally  determined by output, so assume that energy input is a linear function of output, 
ED  ii qf  where α denotes energy consumption per unit  of product and constant β denotes the fixed  
volume of energy input for other purposes . The participant i’s profit Wi after part icipation in the 
emissions trading system is  as following:     iiaiiiiii fepeqCqpW  K,      EDK  iiaiiiii qepeqCqp ,  (6) 
To maximize the participant’s profit, i
eq
W
ii
,
max , the first-order conditions are as following:  
a
i
e pC    (7)   iqai Cpp   KD  (8) 
As analyzed above, industry’s optimal welfare can be achieved with the condition o f I KD . 
According to input-based allocation, only η is fixed in the input-based allocation but α is not taken into 
account. The condition I KD  cannot be ensured and thus the optimal welfare cannot be achieved with 
the input-based allocation approach. 
Auctioning, as mentioned above, has many virtues, but is hard for the market participants to accept. It 
should be prudently considered before any possible action towards this direction , especially at the 
beginning of China’s emissions trading system. So auctioning is not discussed in this paper. 
3. Implementation of output-based allocation 
From the operational perspective, output-based allocation, compared with emission-based allocation, 
has the following advantages: 
x The industry’s welfare under an emissions trading system with the intensity target is improved;  
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x Necessary date for the implementation of the system are easier to get and verify, as t he data on 
production is part of the participant’s daily operation while those of emissions need additional 
monitoring efforts . This is especially true for industries with homogeneous product (e.g. the power 
sector). 
x It encourages participant to reduce emissions through improving energy efficiency instead of declining 
production, and thus gives more incentives on technology innovation and energy efficiency 
improvement.  
However, some challenges exist in the implementation process. Equations (2) and (5) show that the 
optimal welfare can be achieved when I T , meaning that the amount of allowance (A) allocated to 
every participant in each compliance period should equal to the industry’s carbon intensity target (I ) 
times the participant’s actual output (q) in this period. But the actual output is very difficult to predict 
because it is influenced by many factors. In addit ion, different types of products are not comparable, their 
production cannot be directly added up and thus  the allowance cannot be allocated by their output directly. 
Ex-post adjustment can be introduced into the output-based allocation approach to ensure qIA   
and I T . Ex-post adjustment means to issue more allowances to or withdraw a certain amount of the 
allowances from the participants after a compliance period according to the participant’s real production. 
The allowance can be used in next compliance periods. The ex-post adjustment makes the allocation rate 
T  equals to the carbon intensity target I  and guarantees the efficiency of emission trading system. Thus, 
the initial allocation will not have significant impacts. However, in itial allocation should be as accurate as 
possible for the convenience of trading between participants.  
On account of the continuity of production, let 1 tt qIA , where tA  denotes the allowance 
allocated in  the compliance period t and 1tq  denotes the output in the previous  period, then 
ttt AqIqIA  ' '  where tA'  denotes the allowance amount of ex-post adjustment. For a 
declining industry, the allowance in itially allocated to the firms should be deducted by a certain 
percentage according to the development trend of this industry. 
To address the challenge of non-comparab ility of different types of products (products not substitute 
for each), we could convert the output of different products to the same product ’s output. Each  type of 
products i is restricted by intensity target iI  and the corresponding allocation rate based on output is θi. 
The allowances allocated to the participate are: 
¦ n iiqA
1
T
 
According to the condition to achieve the optimal welfare, ii I T , then ¦¦   n iin ii qIqA
11
T
. 
Assume product S is chosen as the standard product with intensity target of sI . The formation of 
above equation could be changed as follows,  
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and it is shown that the output qi (iĮs) of products can be converted to i
s
i q
I
I
. Define a  conversion factor 
s
i
i I
Ik  
 which is the ratio of CO2 emitted per unit output of the two products and i
s
i q
I
I
 has the same 
measure with qs. Thus other products’ output qi can be translated to the standard product S’s output and 
different types of products can be unified. 
4. Conclusion 
China’s carbon intensity target is quite different from the absolute targets as proposed by many 
developed countries; accordingly the best allowance allocation method under China’s future emissions 
trading scheme should be different from the methods used under many of the existing emission trading 
schemes. In a closed system, output-based allocation can help realize the industry’s optimal welfare and is 
the most appropriate approach, under the intensity scenario. An ex-post adjustment of the allocated 
allowances according to the participants’ actual output is however needed after a compliance period. 
Conversion factors are also used to unify the output of different types of products . 
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